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PERSUASION, RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
THE PROCESS OF TRIAL
by Robert S. Redmount*
The Rules of Evidence reflect society's preference that conduct be
judged by reason and morality. They are standards that strongly presume the operation of logic in conduct and judgment, or at least that
conduct is not governed by blatant illogic. They ard- safeguards that
seek to develop or sustain fairness in judgment, or at least they intend
that common moral sensibilities not be violated. Rules of Evidence
are mostly a heritage of common law and reflect accumulating traditions in common juridical experience. Their intent alone makes them a
high water mark of civilization.
We propose to examine the rationale and consider the operation of
Rules of Evidence to illuminate their true effects. It may be, as we are
are inclined to believe, that they are substantially out of tune with the
character of human experience and do little or nothing to assure rationality and fairness in the judgment of conduct.
There is implicit in the promulgation of the Rules a notion or even a
system relating to the process of human judgment. The schema is
simple. The fact and opinion that are the principal data of judgment
must be material and relevant to the kind of decision to be made. For
example, an account of speeding behavior may be logically connected
to a decision about fault in an automobile accident but an account of
the political beliefs of the speeder is ordinarily of no materiality or relevance. Fact and opinion which influence judgment must also influence
by logic and not by emotional or other non-logical prejudice. To draw
attention to speeding conduct in an accident case is relevant to culpability and the allocation of responsibility. To point to the minority
religious beliefs or uncouth eating habits of the party being judged is
not.
The schema is made complete with the implied belief that if illogic
and prejudice relating to the data for decision are barred by rule, the
process of judgment will then somehow be reasonable and fair. An
orderly presentation (Rules of Procedure) in sequence provides data,
rebuttal and summation under the safeguard of rules and reminders
* Clinical Psychologist, Hamden, Connecticut; member of the Connecticut Bar.
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against the operation of illogic and prejudice. Since the schema is fair
and orderly on its face it follows that judgments deriving from it must
reflect the prevailing principles of reason and morality.
Our knowledge of the processes of human conduct has advanced
considerably beyond the confines of Aristotelian logic and Thomistic
morality. In fact, the schema for behavior and judgment, on which the
Rules of Evidence are based, is naive by any current measure of knowledge of behavior. It is not that particular rules of evidence alone are
or may be inconsistent with a better understanding of principles of
human behavior. 'It is that the entire psychological system, thought to
govern the operation and effect of Rules of Evidence in human decision
and judgment, is out of step with reality.
The keystone to the process of judgment is persuasion. That is to
say, we begin not with mechanical rules to govern the operation of judgment but with an understanding of the processes by which judgments
are made.' Judgments are the product of persuasion.
Persuasion, we may say, is the massing and processing of experience in relation to particular matters. An individual confronting a situation or matter which he is to judge is no tabula rasa. He already
has, knowingly or not, certain dispositions, capacities, attitudes and
biases that define and limit the character of his judgment and his judging capabilities. Beyond this he may be persuaded by the immediate
means used to influence his thought and feelings. He will also be influenced by the issues, events and circumstances around which his
judgment is to be formed. In formulary terms, it is not procedural
form plus evidence plus judgment which equals decision. Judgmental decision is more* correctly a product of the adjudicator's dispositions and capabilities, the means of persuasion and the focal issues,
and certain events and circumstances.
1 Problem solving, thinking and judgmental processes and persuasion are the subject
of concentrated study in scientific psychology. Perhaps the best reference identifying
the steps in thinking and judgment is still J. DEWEY, How WE TMrNK (1910). Compare
M. WERTHEIMER, PRODUCTIVE THINKING (1959) and J. BRUNER, J. GOODNOW & G.
AUSTIN, A STUDY OF THINKING (1956) with L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COoNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1957).
The distinguished psychologist Piaget traces reasoning and
growth in mental capacity from infancy to later growth in J. PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND
REASONING IN T- CmILD (1928).
Notable empirical investigations of the process of
persuasion can be found in C. HOvLAND, I. JANIS & H. KELLEY, COMMUNICATION
AND PERSUASION (1953), I. JANIS, PERSONALITY AND PERSUASmILTY (1959) and H.
ABELSON, PERSUASION (1959). The important influence of Freudian thinking and
psychodynamic explanation in matters of persuasion are partly reflected in I. JANIS,
PERSONALITY AND PnSuAsimiLrriY (1959).
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I.

THE ADJUDICATOR'S DISPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES

Persuasion, for the individual, is something that has already happened, is happening and may yet happen to him. Let us explain.
In the process of growth and experience a person acquires certain mental and emotional sets. Some of these sets may be relatively
amenable to change. Personal capacities may be exercised, experience
had and the correct means of influence used so that the individual can
modify his set or can think and act notwithstanding its presence. Other
mental and emotional sets may be more intractable; they may represent
unconscious needs and dispositions of the individual and direct his behavior almost without exception to his subsequent experience. The
mental and emotional sets of the individual tend to define future ways
of experiencing and the kinds and limits of judgment of which the individual is capable.
In order to elucidate we shall give examples of a mental limit, an
emotional block and a social bias, all of which may be construed as
forms of "set" that are relatively intractable and therefore narrow the
scope of a person's judgment and judgmental capacity. We shall also
cite mental and emotional sets that are modifiable and indicate how
they may be modified.
A.

Fixed Mental Limits, EmotionalBlocks and Social Biases

Homer Sapiens is a person of average mental abilities. His grasp
of ideas in verbal form had always been better than his grasp of
ideas' in mathematical form. In fact, he early took a dislike to
things expressed in numbers because of his disaffection for his third
grade arithmetic teacher. Her relentless manner and pedagogical approach resulted in an emotional block and mental limit notwithstanding
the fact that Homer was experiencing difficulty and confusion. Homer
unconsciously developed an "I don't understand" attitude without even
trying to understand. Moreover, his "set" was to block out any matter presented to him in the form of tables, formulas, graphs, statistics or
other numerical forms. These offered him no substance that he could or
would absorb. It was just "too hard" and became irrelevant to him.
He also tended to transfer some of his frustrated feeling to the parties
who would confront him with these forms of numerical challenge. He
experienced some hostility and felt some negative bias toward those
who insisted that he understand by presenting an issue to him in numerical terms.
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Clearly, Homer Sapiens exhibits a mental limit and an emotional
block that is excessive even for persons who generally experience
difficulties with numbers. Nonetheless, his and their experience reflect varying degrees of mental limit when faced with certain kinds
of problems and judgments or, to put the matter in a juridical context, when faced with certain kinds of evidence or certain ways of
presenting evidence.
Homer Sapiens, perhaps because of the inevitability that he would
face some numbers during his life, did develop some shorthand mental
processes to deal with numerical problems which he could not entirely
avoid. He would endeavour to "reduce" the problem and yet arrive
at a solution or judgment by selecting only one set of readings from
the different dimensions of a problem that would be given. He would
then employ simple arithmetic judgments and arrive at some approximation of an outcome or solution which he would then accept as an
answer or evidence. Of course this was a private mental matter so that
others might not observe his loose and erroneous approach to the
numerical problem. This would especially be true if he did not have
to relate his particular mode of reasoning or his specific thoughts and
judgments in arriving at his solution to the problem. He could then
appear as having exercised thoughtful judgment.
Psyche Angst is a rather sensitive person. Her behavior and feelings are not remarkable and do not distinguish her from other people.
They belie the fact that Psyche has many substantial fears and unconscious emotional dispositions that "fix" or "set" how she is able to
perceive and respond to different experiences in life. Psyche grew up
in a "strict" home. Any disposition to rebel or disobey was treated
with severity. Psyche learned to conform and to approve of order and
discipline. Additionally, she disliked those whose behavior exhibited
poor emotional control or some other form of unorthodoxy. Psyche
experienced, entirely at an unconscious level, feelings that she would
regard as immoral and shameful. She was unconsciously fearful that
these might be revealed in her behavior. For some consciously unaccountable reason, she tended to be very critical and disapproved of
matters that appeared to be unclean or disorderly. She also showed
a strong negative bias toward any behavior that might suggest or reveal any impropriety or lack of moral character.
Psyche grew up with these feelings and attitudes. They were reflected in her cautious, sensitive and proper behavior and were as much
a part of her as the shape of her nose and the color of her skin.
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Psyche's emotional blocks could be revealed in her strong attitudes
and biases about certain matters. However, they could go unnoticed
if there were no cue that she could not stand disorder or that the mere
suggestion of behavioral impropriety would arouse hostility and a negative bias toward the behavior source.
Psyche had an acute dislike of people who stuttered and of those
who used poor grammar. For her this was symbolic of a lack of behavior control. She was also quick to think the worst of those accused
of immoral or improper behavior but maintained that she was a fairminded person. Psyche almost instinctively disliked people who, to her,
appeared unkempt. Nor did she like "loud" people. She was more
infuriated and terrified than she realized by people who expressed
opinions or did things that seemed to be contrary to her concept of
"fair play", "normal behavior" or "proper social conduct". Psyche
experienced many of her attitudes and biases as tensions. Although
not outspoken about these attitudes and biases, she might feel upset or
demonstrate her sensitivity over them. To others she appeared to
be a sensitive, cautious and retiring person-hardly one who might be
emotionally blocked or strongly biased and prejudiced.
Psyche, like Homer Sapiens, had shown more than her share of
emotional blockage and the consequent unconscious bias and prejudice
that can occur in "norma' human beings. The matter is one of degree. The nature of the emotional blocks and the resultant emotional
"sets" and biases may of course vary. In a juridical context this means
that prejudgment occurs and the judging person may be "persuaded"
about certain matters even before the immediate evidence is presented
to him. Moreover, the prejudgment may be about something of limited
relevance, such as the way a defendant speaks or wears his clothes.
Despite these factors, prejudgment may go far toward determining
whether the defendant is to be found guilty or responsible in regard to
particular litigated behavior that is rationally unrelated to his clothes
and speech.
Psyche Angst could be consciously persuaded to be fair in her judgments of persons or situations and to lay aside her biases. Her honorable
intentions may be above question, but unconscious biases and emotional
"sets" create a kind of "blindness", lack of perceptual skill or misperception that cannot help but influence, and even direct, judgment.
Babbitt Jones grew up in a community where Blacks, Jews, Russians and Arabs were scant minorities or scarcely known. Babbitt absorbed and reflected the ritualism, orthodoxy and faint bias that char-
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acterized religion, social practices, politics and apparent business practices in his community. There was a scent of displeasure and rejection in all that seemed alien to this social system. Babbitt was subtly
taught and learned to regard Blacks as disreputable and incorrigible,
Jews as devious and mercenary, Russians as stubborn and revolutionary, and Arabs as wild-eyed and insane. Since Babbitt enjoyed the
forms and practices in his social life, and felt very much a part of it, he
did not wish to see it disrupted. He almost instinctively felt a bias
against an alien presence and was quick to ascribe to aliens any negative characteristics or judgments that might be suggested. In fact,
aliens were unconsciously experienced as a threat and Babbitt had
more destructive feelings toward such "outsiders" than he may have
recognized.
As we have mentioned, Babbitt Jones had little or no real exposure
to the minority groups he disliked. One experience in childhood centered in his mind. A transient Black man was seen talking to white
girls and Babbitt later heard his parents speak of what had occurred.
The Black man was accused of accosting the white girls with an immoral
intent. He was given the choice of being prosecuted on some charge
of sexual transgression or leaving town. He left town. Babbitt recalled the vehemence of his parents' feelings about the incident. He
also had recurrent dreams of big Black men waiting in hiding to assault
little boys such as Babbitt, particularly if the little boys were bad. This
imagery and association never quite left Babbitt and he has disliked
aliens and especially Blacks all his life.
Babbitt Jones was not an unkind man. He held a strong belief in
the system of law and justice in his country. Without flinching, however, he was not above "bending" a legal result where Blacks and
other aliens might be involved. To put the matter differently, in any
given juridical matter involving alien persons he was at least partly persuaded of their culpability or guilt even before the matter was heard.
This was a social bias that he shared with, and that may have been
supported by, his community.
Social biases reflected by the individual and enjoying community
aderence may be construed in such a way that they appear not to be
biases at all. The individual is absolved of any guilt or impropriety
in his attitude if he can adapt a community norm stating, for instance,
that Blacks are "different" and should be judged by different standards. Babbitt Jones could, with just a bit of mental legerdemain,
claim if pressed that he truly had no bias against Blacks or aliens.
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It is only that there may be an unstated assumption that foreigners or,
more correctly, intruders can properly be judged quite critically. This
may be a "correct", culturally shared emotional "set".
B.

Modifiable "PriorPersuasion"

The degree of "prior persuasion" experienced by an individual may
not be so immense or so intractable that it is practically beyond further influence. The prior persuasion may be a function of some limited
or distorted information and knowledge. It may be modified where
information can be correctly perceived, substantially understood and,
preferably, rationally interpreted. The intensity of emotional commitment to particular social values also bears on the possibility that seemingly fixed attitudes may be further persuaded. A lesser or uncertain
commitment may be subject to rational and emotive influences that may
move a person away from a fixed and seemingly intransigent position.
Again, an illustration may be helpful. Carl Schmidt grew up in an
authoritarian family structure where strict obedience was required of
children. When transgressions occurred it was commonplace that
the offender be severely punished physically. Physical punishment of
children was not unusual. Carl, experiencing these patterns of authority
behavior as normal and conventional, unthinkingly had come to accept
and believe that there was no offense in an adult's administration of
severe physical punishment to a child. His "prior persuasion" took
the form of acceptance and approval of physical beatings as a means
of punishment if asked about or exposed to the problem.
At a later point in life Carl Schmidt was asked to judge a situation
in which it was claimed that the severe physical punishment of a child
by an adult constituted cruelty and that some sanction or remedy be
invoked. His emotional leanings reflected childhood experience and
his sense of values argued that there was no proper claim. However, in the course of decision he was exposed to the presentation of a
psychological expert who offered meticulous evidence and opinion to
show that severe physical punishment was severely damaging to the
child's personality. He also heard the account by the victim, revealing a feeling of torture and upset, that Schmidt had not felt or recognized in his early experience. Carl Schmidt's emotional leanings and
value judgments were not so strong that he could not be influenced
by persuasive observation and information. His disposition on matters
of adults punishing children notwithstanding, he was able to render a
decision that departed from his prior persuasion. Parenthetically, it
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may be noted that this might not have been the case if his own experience had involved uncertain repression of angry feelings over physical
beatings. His uncertainty and need to resolve his psychic tensions
might have led him to take a strong restrictive attitude approving physical punishment in order unconsciously to reinforce control over his
own feelings. The modification of a prior persuasion also might not
have occurred if he had not been exposed to more thorough information persuasively presented or to emotional reactions and experiences
that offered a meaningful contrast to his own.
C.

The Basis of Judgment: Internal Disposition
v. External Evidence

The thrust of "prior persuasion' is that the key to convincing and
conviction may lie in the judge's person and his experience more than
it lies in the evidence around him. If this is so, then evidence aimed
at rational persuasion, or on appeal to emotions and values that are
alien or opposed, has no real value or influence for the judging individual. We can put this observation in the form of a proposition. The
best assurance of fair consideration and thoughtful decision in a justiciable matter is the personal qualification and self-knowledge of the
judge. He must be able to identify and eliminate the influence of
"prior persuasion" in his judging. Awareness and control of mental
and emotional processes assures a freer flow of information and accessibility to a variety of influences and thus a more undistorted judging
process. We should look to the careful selection and preparation
of adjudicators for effective judging more than to the influence and
implied infallibility of mechanical rules of evidence that seek to control
the judging process externally. Prospective adjudicators might best
be schooled in the mental and emotional processes that relate to judging. This may be a better and more pertinent preparation than instruction in rationally-rigged, emotionally unconscious methods of procedure and rules for discriminating evidence.
There is a feeble equivalent to the "freedom from undue influence"
kind of judging. That is to allow the representation of bias and prejudice into the decision-making process and assume that individual
biases or prejudices balance or cancel each other out. This is a premise, stated or unstated, behind the "cross section of the community"
idea in jury selection and decision (noting that juries are supposedly
restricted by mechanical rules to decision only on the facts). There
is no assurance that biases will either be balanced or cancelled. They

19711

PROCESS OF TRIAL

may be stacked or, put differently, the stronger or more persuasive
bias may dominate. Some biases in the range of human experience
may not be represented at all. Even if biases could balance or cancel
each other, the decision rests only on an emotional interplay and there is
usually insufficient indication that intelligence and careful reflection or
thought have played their role in the decision. There is a truer crosssectional representation of mental and emotional dispositions, and resulting consideration of opinion, in one individual who can sense and
understand many reasons or feelings than there is in three, six or twelve
individuals who provide untamed biases and unevaluated intelligence.
II.

Tim MEANS OF PERSUASION

Reason, in the trial process, is officially the means of persuasion.
That is, presentation according to a logical order and disputation based
on syllogistic reasoning are the recognized means for establishing cause
and effect and determining consequences in a justiciable matter. Judgment of events and the choice of outcome are also directed by an appeal to certain preferred social values. In fact, some of these preferred
values may be built into presumptions and procedural and substantive
rules that are operative in the trial process. We shall devise a case to
illustrate the trial persuasion process in its theoretical and formal
appearance.
A.

The Trial as a Formaland Rational Process

Leroy Soul stands trial charged with incitement to riot, resisting
arrest and aggravated assault. It appears that Soul, a well-known Black
leader, was giving a speech on a busy street comer in his district.
Amidst a gathering crowd he harangued against the city government
and made what appeared to be inflammatory remarks. These may have
incited the audience to take action against oppressors on behalf of Black
interests. Two attendant policemen, apparently fearing a riot, asked
and then commanded Soul to move on. Soul refused. When the
policemen sought to arrest him he became vitriolic and would not allow
them to take him bodily from the scene. A short time later some of the
crowd that had gathered to hear Leroy Soul were seen ransacking and
pilfering from stores in the neighborhood in what seemed to be a systematic destructive venture.
According to the prescribed system of trial order and logic the prosecutor will accuse Soul of violating the law and then endeavour to prove
the facts that establish his guilt. He will first present evidence, using
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testimony from witnesses and demonstrative evidence to show a direct
causal and consequential relationship between Soul's behavior, subsequent events, and the charges of which he is accused. The prosecutor
will select witnesses who observed Soul's behavior and the behavior of
the crowd. He will introduce witnesses who can testify as to the events
that took place between Soul and the policemen. To buttress his case
the prosecutor may also use evidence of personal habits, behavior and
evidence of Soul's prior conviction for incitement to riot. He may seek
to introduce these for the purpose of showing that Soul works according
to a plan that is consistent with the intentions and behavior of which he
is accused.
In making his legal argument for the conviction of Soul the prosecutor
will also endeavour to demonstrate by analogy that the case he is presenting falls under a line of prior cases. In these the accused, under
similar fact circumstances and with similar applicable law, have been
found guilty of similar charges. He will endeavour to classify the relevant behavior and law in the case. The prosecutor may also include
certain preferred social values in his argument. For instance, he may
stress to the judge and jury, among other things, the importance of law
and order in maintaining civilized conduct, the inviolacy of citizens'
rights to their property and the social destructiveness of a criminal disposition.
To insure that logic and fairness govern in the trial process the prosecutor will be required to observe certain rules of evidence. He will
not only have to abide by certain constitutional requirements, common
law or statutory presumptions and rules that establish the burden of
proof, but he must also assign a value as to what constitutes proof and
determine the balance of rights, duties and powers between the individual and his government. Some examples may be noted. Cardinal in
the Rules of Evidence is the proscription against hearsay. What a witness has heard from others, as distinguished from what he himself has
observed, may not in the usual course of trial be offered in testimony.
Such evidence is presumed to be unfair and lacking in credibility. A
non-expert witness' opinion testimony is also barred by the rule that
such an opinion may distort or misappropriate the observable facts.
There are rules against cultivating emotional bias or social prejudice
against the defendant and there are rules against willful character incrimination. Notable among the rules and presumptions operative in a criminal trial are those that hold the accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty, that the burden of proof falls on the prosecution, and that
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there must be proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" to convict. The presumptions are, among other things, an expression of the civility of a
society and its social and political preferences. They are also a focal or
an additional means to insure an orderly process and to regularize the
requirements of logical and sufficient proof during trial.
Defense counsel will seek to refute the prosecution's contentions,
again by the ostensible use of logic and the resort to certain value preferences expressed in certain rules and presumptions. He will first
claim that the prosecutor's premises relating to the intent and effect
of Soul's behavior are inaccurate. He thus seeks to negate the syllogism that certain intention and behavior leading to certain consequences is proscribed; that the defendant engaged in such intention and
behavior; and that the defendant is therefore guilty as charged. Defense counsel will seek to challenge the credibility of prosecution witnesses by showing, among other things, confusion, lack of certainty
and faulty memory. He will also present his own witnesses and demonstrative evidence to disprove that any causal relationship exists between Sours conduct and the subsequent riot. He will also seek to
prove, in further factual refutation of the prosecution's charges, that
Leroy Soul's political and legal rights were violated by the manhandling policemen and that he had justification in resisting them. Defense
counsel will invoke analogous cases to show that there is no holding of
guilt for behavior and circumstances similar to those in the present case.
The sanctity of a logical and fair trial process is presumed to be protected by rules of evidence such as those previously mentioned. The
defendant may be protected against unfair bias or prejudice through
evidentiary rules such as those that proscribe the introduction of evidence of personal character or those that compel introduction of confidential communication between an attorney and his client. The political
presumption of innocence and the constitutional rule against self-incrimination are illustrations of procedure and regulation that move to
guarantee a humane trial process stressing human dignity as a guiding
value.
The adjudicators are also bound by rules and procedures that stress
fair consideration and logical conclusion. The judge, in his instructions to the jury, will suggest the decision alternatives and the logical
arrangement of facts required to arrive at a verdict. His legal holdings must also be implicitly supported by logical connection to existing
law, using such processes as influence, deduction, classification and
analogy. Evidence of bias, willfulness or incompetence in forming logi-
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cal and fair decisions may serve to disqualify adjudicators and may lead
to reversal of a judgment.
The design of trials should afford fair and just results. That is, such
might be the outcome if human beings do indeed relate to a system according to the processes of formal logic. Common observation of trials
affords the conclusion that persuasion is not simply a matter of logic
applied to facts and rules and further guided by certain value emphasis.
Persuasion is the art of influence, not the science of deduction. Therefore, as it functions in trial it is composed of 1) appeals to various
kinds of emotion, 2) logical harnessing of selective or partial facts
and rules to certain conclusions, 3) value emphasis to remind of duty,
preference or responsibility, and 4) dramatic technique to heighten attention with regard to certain matters. The persuader will seek
to use any or all of these means to achieve not so much a fair or logical
result as a favorable one.
A practiced lawyer knows how to use a familiar system of rules, such
as trial procedures, rules of evidence, legal presumptions and substantive law as variables rather than constants. In other words, he can
shade, stress or even misuse these to fit the scheme of persuasion he
adopts. He can play the entire situation-the issues, the rules and the
parties to be persuaded-for the best effect and a partisan result. Let
us observe what happens to the rules of evidence when they are utilized
in the strategies of trial persuasion.
B. The Strategiesof Trial Persuasion
In the case of Leroy Soul the prosecutor will seek to create or exploit feelings of dislike toward Soul. If he can generate this disposition
or bias he can more easily "sell" the logic of guilt to the adjudicators.
He gives them the means for justifying a guilty verdict by offering a
choice of facts and law sufficient to uphold the decision. He can buttress his case and intensify the disposition to a finding against Soul by
appealing to commonly held values. He can focus on values which uphold order, reject "badness" and recognize the sanctity of loyalty to a
traditional political system. Having set the strategy of persuasion,
with emotional appeal as the primary base, the prosecutor then considers techniques he can use to dramatize the "points" that will establish the bias and set of rationalizations that he seeks to cultivate. That
is, he "plays" the system for best effect.
The prosecutor will seek to dramatize Leroy Soul's "badness" and his
more ugly or threatening qualities. He may not be able to do this by
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presenting direct character evidence since he is stymied by a rule generally prohibiting such evidence. However, other rules of evidence can
better serve his purpose. For instance, it is generally true that a fact
qualifies for admission if it meets only one condition even though it
may be proscribed under a variety of other conditions. In other words,
one cannot introduce a fact if it tends to be unfair, generally irrelevant
or lacking in probity; on the other hand, one can introduce such a fact
if it can be considered to be only slightly relevant. Leroy Soul's
state of mind may be shown (under the "state of mind" exception to
the rule against hearsay evidence) prior to his excited or inflammatory
speech-making as evidence of his motive. Soul exclaimed to a fellow
patron at a bar shortly before his speech that he was frustrated by the
political system that suppressed his people and that he was going to
destroy it. Furthermore, he "hated cops and would crucify any one of
them that laid a hand on him." Soul's "state of mind" appears clear.
Presented in evidence it is a link that can logically connect Soul's motive and intent to his incendiary speech and to the disruptive acts that
followed. More important, so far as the process of persuasion is concerned, the prosecutor recognizes that Soul's spontaneous comments
damn him as a trouble-maker, an undesirable and perhaps an incorrigible. This is a dramatic point that sets in motion a strong bias against
Soul. It is a bias that forms in the feelings and thoughts of the adjudicators that may serve as a basis for seeking and needing to find Soul

guilty.
In effect, the prosecutor may determine that he has a more effective case against Soul if he forges biases and emotional resentments
against the defendant rather than trying to stress the logical tightness (clear cause and effect) between Soul's behavior and subsequent
events. He may add dramatic points by introducing Soul's prior
criminal record to show that he had a clear and deliberate plan
to foment disturbances and that Soul was convicted on another occasion for deliberately encouraging his fellow Blacks to take up arms and
shoot offending policemen. This may not only show Soul's propensity
for the crime, but that similarities between the kind and manner of
speech for which he is presently indicted and those for which he had
previously been convicted are altogether striking. The logical connection is there and, more important from the prosecutor's tactical viewpoint, it is evidence which dramatizes Soul's character and qualifies as
an "exception" to the rule against character evidence. He may be
perceived as vicious and despicable and may be regarded as a threat to
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everyone's peace and security. Conscious and sub-conscious fear
and feelings of threat are generated in the adjudicators and warrant
that Soul somehow be convicted. The slimmest logical support will
then justify such a result.
Another type of "dramatic point" the prosecutor may utilize to fortify
feelings of bias and a desire to convict may be found in the demonstrative evidence. Sours supporters had distributed to the assembled
crowd thin plastic clubs, in the shape of bowling tenpins, just before
Soul gave his speech. Each club had "Show This; Back Leroy
Soul" on it. The prosecutor will introduce these in evidence to show
that they were intended as weapons and were in fact used to smash
windows in the subsequent pillaging. The introduction of the imprinted thin plastic club in the context of other inflammatory evidence
about Soul helps to reinforce feelings of revulsion and resentment. In
effect, the demonstrative evidence with some logical connection to the
matters under indictment serves mostly as a symbol to remind adjudicators of the horrors of one Leroy Soul. By now he is being pictured
as a menace of immense proportions to society and even a less rational
justification may be needed for a determination of his guilt.
Soul's defense counsel may present factual evidence offering effective logical contrast to that generated by the prosecution. Sours
speech may be shown to have contained conciliatory, cautioning or
chastening passages. Unrelated events intervening between Soul's
speech and the subsequent pillaging may be shown to have offered a
strong incitement to riot. For instance, a Black child may have been
accidentally struck down by a police car in the community. Selective
testimony may show that Soul's resistance to arrest was really resistance
to being arbitrarily manhandled by the police. There is sufficient
ambiguity in the logical outcome of the "fact plus rule equals decision" relationship, perhaps because of the highly selective presentations of evidence by both sides, that judgment may be dominated by
the attitudes and biases that the attorneys can effectively muster or exploit.
Defense counsel, in his persuasion strategy, may seek to appeal to the
element of fairness and to the traditions of a legal system that protect
individual rights. In effect, he makes a strong value appeal that has
deep emotional roots. He also seeks to exploit sentiment favoring the
underdog and those who have had to endure privation and discrimination. He will seek to identify Leroy Soul more as a victim than a perpetrator, and thereby benefit from the premise that there is more
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solicitude toward victims. Further, in a counteroffensive move calculated to vitiate certain emotional dispositions in the adjudicators and
replace them with other biases, defense counsel will seek to show that
various prosecution witnesses are sly or devious, dishonest, grossly prejudiced and rancorous. These are all characteristics that may incite revulsive feeling toward the prosecution and effectively cancel the probative value of testimony offered in its behalf.
Defense counsel may cite with emphasis, even with dramatic fury,
the defendant's constitutional right to freedom of speech. He may cite
judicial opinion having impeccable credentials to the effect that exhortations such as those of Leroy Soul are no more than an exercise of
free speech. Counsel may incite feelings of patriotism and cultivate resentment toward injustice so that Soul is more nearly experienced
as the offended party. Testimony may be introduced to suggest and, if
possible, to stress the point of brutality in the police toward Soul.
This incites resentment toward the bully, a resentment that may find
favor in those who tend to regard authority as excessive. Counsel may
seek to impeach prosecution witnesses by ostensibly discrediting perceptual accuracy but actually implying bias in the way a witness has
viewed events. By introducing prior statements or behavior of a witness to show an inconsistency, he may by innuendo cultivate the feeling that the witness is cunning and devious. If he can do this with a
sufficient number of witnesses he may be able to reinforce the suggestion and feeling that the prosecution and its witnesses are conspiratorial against Soul. Soul can, indeed, be shown as a victim who is
being "railroaded", suffering an injustice as would arouse fear and resentment in most of us.
C.

Limitations on Truth and Fairnessin the Trial Process

In the strategy of persuasion, the rules of evidence at trial operate on
tracks at two levels. Ostensibly, the "upper" level composes a system
to determine truth by emphasizing logical connections between presented facts, selected rules and a consequent rational decision. The
more potent level of operation, however, is the "lower" or perhaps
even subconscious level. Here, there is a system of influencing and
emotional impact utilized to establish favor first and most of all. Attitudes and feelings are systematically manipulated and elements are
dramatized so as to incite loyalty to certain values and to create or exploit emotional dispositions that are the "real" basis of decision. In
the final analysis a trial decision is a result of the effective exploita-
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tion of rational and especially emotional denominators of experience.
Because emotional components are formally proscribed, they are not
sytematically included or evaluated in the method and result of the trial
process. In the spirit of Machiavellian diplomacy they are operationally effective, and even decisive, but formally prohibited.
An implicit thesis one may offer in defense of the adversary method
is that a fair result occurs when, to use Macaulay's apt description, "two men argue, as unfairly as possible, on opposite sides." A
shakedown of arguments distills only the truth, and it is the truth relating to the subject of argument that is ultimately persuasive. Truth
and fairness are joined to produce the best of all possible results. It is
the process that guarantees the quality of the result. It is suggested
that trial procedure and the rules of evidence offer and represent a
narrow and incomplete construction of the process of persuasion.
They contribute to and are used to achieve unfair results. It may be
suggested further that the "shakedown" method of polemically presenting evidence does not provide sufficient indication or assurance of
truth.
Attorneys, seeking a partisan outcome sanctioned by the adversary
process, understandably seek and present fact and rule evidence that
best fits their case. The choice of evidence is highly selective and limited to what is viable and effective in a courtroom. It is not all of the
available and mustered evidence that is regarded as essential, favorable or usable and subject to review. Furthermore, the availability
of evidence may depend on research skills and facility. The result
may be the presentation of sketchy or only the most obvious evidence while the omissions contain much that is or should be critical
to a case. The concern is not only that truth may only be approximate
because the data on which it is based is incomplete. It is also that apparent truth may be a distortion because the selection and presentation
of data is so much a matter of bias.
The attorney for Leroy Soul may know that Soul has fears about
homosexuality. As Soul reported the matter to him in confidential communication, Soul was fearful he was being homosexually attacked when
the policemen approached to contain, to hold and possibly arrest him.
He panicked and struck at his would-be attackers. This might be
relevant information used as a defense, or perhaps in mitigation of the
charge of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. However, defense
counsel also knows that there may be such a strong prejudice against
homosexuals or those tending homosexuality that the party so affected
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has a heavier burden of persuasion. Instead of homosexual fear being
an explanation for conduct it becomes the emotional basis for indictment of the defendant. Defense counsel may choose not to offer evidence relevant to the truth of matters and issues in the case.
The prosecuting attorney may know through a police informer that
Soul is a member of a political group which actively meets for the purpose of political revolution. This evidence could be highly relevant to
Soul's motives and conduct relating to the principal issue of incitement
to riot with which he is charged. However, police and prosecution may
decide that they do not wish to "blow the cover" of their undercover
agent at this time. They would prefer to risk an adverse decision resulting from the incompleteness of the evidence. Furthermore, the
prosecuting attorney may decide that he does not want to use an informer as a witness because the informer makes a "bad" witness.
That is, defense counsel may be able to succeed in turning bias against
the informer and the party he represents because of the underhanded
character of the informer's methods. Further, the informer may make
a bad impression because of his poor articulation, confusion in response to intense examination and generally "suspicious" appearance.
Therefore the attorney may decide not to use the informer's unique
testimony, leaving an unnoticeable but nonetheless existent gap in the
evidence.
Bias in the selection of evidence may be no more an obstacle to the
ascertainment of truth than is the lack of resources or the lack of skill
to acquire and develop the evidence. An attorney may not wish to
spend money or perhaps hire an investigator to discover more of the
facts pertaining to a case. He may rely on evidence presented or made
readily available to him. He may not muster the potent legal argument
that the case affords because he does not give the time to adequately
search and analyze less familiar legal rules and decisions that could
be crucial. In effect, evidence and argument become more a matter
of opportunity than inquiry, and truth suffers.
The limitation on truth is not only a function of limited inquiry and
advocacy. The adjudicator's digestion of evidence requires that he be
offered continuity of information and argument relatively free from
distraction, deliberate distortion or dismemberment. He also requires
concentration free from the disturbing and distortive influence of excessive time span, frequent interruptions and dramatic interferences.
Assembling, analyzing and deciding are systematic psychological processes in which the individual exercises a mental and emotional dis-
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cipline and direction. He consciously and unconsciously searches for
the intellectual consistencies and emotional harmonies that help him to
identify and then compare various experiences and interpretations. He
does not think in a fragmented way but in terms of composition and
unity. He should not feel explosively or excitedly in terms of some
stimulus but should be aided to identify and assimilate emotional implications without being jarred into a narrow position or reaction.
There is a limit to what he can absorb instantly and what he can retain and organize in his mind. He must be able to experiment with
combinations of logic and feeling and fact and theory to find the best
"fit" for a decision. This is both a rational and an emotional process.
He needs assistance in the form of systematic blocks of information
and groupings of facts and theory so that he can more effectively identify, analyze and organize data and arrive at conclusions. In other
words, even though he may not be emotionally biased or previously
persuaded toward certain decisions, the adjudicator needs a system of
data presentation and analysis that helps him to make thorough and
reliable rational and emotional determinations and judgments.
The psychological character and the practical operations of the adversary procedure in trials are such that the adjudicator is 1) presented
with fragments of data interrupted by less relevant fragments or contradictions that do not help him to get a clear picture of a piece of
data even as a postulate, 2) jolted by dramatic revelations or pounding procedures that interrupt rather than facilitate his processes of reasoning and feeling, 3) distracted by various rules as to how and what
he is to consider (rules that are accentuated, ignored, contested and
challenged so that he is not aided in the process of continuity and consistency in making his observations and judgments), and 4) victimized
by exaggeration, distortion and manipulation in the adversarial procedure so that he perhaps should concentrate more on not being deceived than on accepting and studying the facts and issues before him.
We may then conclude that rules of evidence and trial procedures, in
practice, produce a cacophony rather than a symphony of sounds,
thoughts and conclusions. It is likely (and little wonder) that many
and perhaps most trial decisions are more arbitrary than we choose to
realize. They may be the product of various distortions, and subtle
dishonesties. The designated procedure, uncomprehending as it is in
regard to the process of persuasion and the true mode of human decision-making, encourages and produces this result. Rabelais' satire
about judicial processes may not be far off the mark. We may recall
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that Judge Bridlegoose was asked, "How do you determine the obscurity of arguments offered by the litigants?" Judge Bridlegoose replied, "When there are many bags on either end of the table, I use
my small dice, just as you do, gentlemen, in accordance with the
law ... .2 There are those who take their cue from history and regard our juridical system as a marvel of human construction. Today,
we can and should do better.
III.

IssuEs,

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES iN LITIGATION

Issues, events and circumstances form a third dimension of the
equation for persuasion. They constitute a kind of discrete influence
that carries persuasion in some particular direction. They attach to
the dispositions of the adjudicator and they affect the efforts directly
made to influence him.
A.

Personaland Social Bias, and "Instant"Persuasion

One kind of issue, event or circumstance is that about which the adjudicator may have some special and personal sensitivity. This is not
to say that he has a biased interest in the usual sense. This would be
the case if a judge were to sit in judgment of his son or of a corporation
that he partly owns. A case may involve indictment for a sex crime.
This may convey a very personal meaning and feeling for an adjudicator who has strong sexual fears or conflicts. His preoccupations and
perhaps his prior persuasion on the matter would not occur if he were
instead sitting in judgment on an accident case, a bankruptcy matter
or another case. An adjudicator may be faced with a case of fraudulent
stock transaction. If he himself is a heavy trader in the stock market
he, knowingly or not, has a special sensitivity or personal disposition
in the case cultivated by the nature of the issue he is to decide.
On the other hand, the issue, event or circumstance under judgment may not have personal meaning that may critically affect the persuasion possibilities in the case. It is the social importance, the political pressure or the community emotional climate that may influence
the possibilities of persuasion. A criminal conspiracy case, reflecting
the operation of crime that threatens and excites a community, by its
nature creates leanings, dispositions or biases in the adjudicator. Minimally, he is or may be affected as a citizen. The trial outcome of a
Communist may be a foregone conclusion in times when such an un2
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popular minority is deemed a dire threat to political survival. A party
may be faced with a charge of reckless driving and gross negligence
in an accident case involving bodily injury to the plaintiff. He may
not fare well in the struggle for persuasion in an emotional climate
where a child has just recently been killed by a hit-and-run driver.
Means do exist in trials to counter the bias or "instant persuasion"
created by exceptional issues, events or circumstances. The means reflect a doctrine of "hear no evil, see no evil, think no evil". Jurors
are physically isolated so that they appear to be exposed to and influenced by proper proceedings in the court room and nothing more.
Attorneys, recognizing the threat of "instant persuasion", seek a change
of venue or time for the threat to abate. Most feeble and silly of all
the vitiating techniques are the ones in the courtroom that admonish
jurors not to hear and consider what they have already heard and considered. An element of obvious prejudice may be skillfully or inadvertently introduced into a proceeding. A judge may exclaim, "Strike
that remark as prejudicial!" after the jurors have figuratively fallen
out of their seats from the impact of the disclosure. Subscribing to
the thesis that some bias may be eradicable once it is conveyed, and
that it can no longer be merely a quantum in judgment, a decision of
mistrial in a matter may be carried.
B.

The Experience of Intellectual Complexity,
Confusion and Ignorance

Bias, or "instant persuasion", is one kind of impact resulting from the
character of issues, events and circumstances to be judged. Another
is confusion resulting from ignorance, and this may be concealed
or denied. Worse, it may be deemed corrected by the inherent analytical and equitable character of a trial proceeding that may seem to
reduce issues and facts to their simple essentials. Let us cite an example, and explain. A case in issue involves medical malpractice or a
question of engineering competency and responsibility. The factual
issues, especially, are of an esoteric nature. Practices and their underlying theories, and standards of performance, are sufficiently known
only to those trained in the field. The legal issues are unexceptional
but fact determination by a lay judge or jury is bound to be a difficult
matter. Undaunted, the processes of law treat the matter as ordinary
and within its true competence. It is as if jurisdiction over all matters
of justice and ultimately over all conflicts compels some common juridical means of decision. That there is or should be legal jurisdiction
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because a question of justice is involved is scarcely ever doubted. Certainly no doubt as to legal jurisdiction is offered in non-ecclesiastical
matters. The contemplation furthest from a lawyer's or judge's mind
would be a lack of jurisdiction on the ground of a lack of juridical
competence to decide the issues!
Instead, attorneys for disputants become medical or engineering
actors. They lift words and concepts from a strange discipline without a full or adequate understanding of theoretical issues, fact reliability and questions of standard. They present evidence and advocate
solutions from such truncated data as if there were no further or complicated problem in understanding. They enjoin expert opinion to give
testimony and seek to frame this testimony so as to give simple casual
accounts of complex matters and simple judgments where simple "yes
or no" decisions are a travesty and grossly inappropriate to the problem. The problem is fitted to the legal mold in the same manner that
Procrustes fitted his victims to a bed.
It is the opinion of the adjudicator that is ultimately sought upon all
(including complex) matters. He may know or understand even less
about esoteric matters than the courtroom actors who have familiarized themselves with some relevant phrases and concepts in a strange
discipline. He is truly confused because he must decide weighty matters about which he is truly ignorant and about which he cannot
learn in a fortnight. Nonetheless, the processes of justice grind on.
They are made to seem rational because they comport with the forms
of a simple syllogistic mode that is a supposed guarantor of truth and
justice. The adjudicator may try to understand and give some semblance of a rational decision. However, he will likely suffer through
his confusion and may land on a decision based on some extraneous
elements or combination of elements such as the personality of the advocate, the need and despair of a litigant, the comprehensibility of some
terms that he can put into his equation for decision, and the behavior
of witnesses. More likely, if he is a judge rather than a juror, he may
follow the arguments and learn the phrases and concepts offered in
evidence by the attorneys. With this as representation of the real issues and problems he can use this limited language and his understanding to forge a simple answer to a complex problem.
The peculiar qualities of issues, events and circumstances need to be
dealt with in terms of their impact on persuasion. In some instances
there may be no appeal from their prejudicial impact, even though we
would choose to regard every and any issue as subject to a fair process
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of judgment. In times of hysteria or continuing emergency certain
fairs and biases may prevail somewhat universally in adjudicators as
well as in other members of the body public. In some instances, notably in the case of confusion based on ignorance, the protections of
fair and knowledgeable judgment may lie in defining competence to
hear matters more carefully. Some matters can only be meaningfully
understood and decided by adjudicators trained and sensitive to issues
that are special, complex and esoteric. In most instances, the best
guarantee that issues, events and circumstances will not have an inordinate influence on persuasion lies in the mental and emotional insights
and competences of the adjudicators. Realistically, an adjudicator
may not be able to exclude or eradicate a prejudicial influence. One
cannot seal off a person sufficiently from his environment, his experience and his capacity for awareness to exclude intrusive observations.
Neither can one bar an effect on thought and feeling because the experiencing person has been admonished not to think or feel about it.
These are magical solutions based on primitive thinking or primitive
conceptions of man's mental and emotional operations. An adjudicator
can seek to control the impact of experience, and to assess it properly,
and allocate to it reasonable value by developing consciousness of mental and emotional processes-his own as well as that of others. The
best guarantee of fair and knowledgeable decision lies not in the mechanical protections of "Objection allowed!" or "Strike that statement!"
but in the power and confidence of "Know thyself!"
Persuasion, then, remains the touchstone of juridical process. The
viability and effectiveness of juridical process depends upon a proper
regard of the persuasive process and how it works. If the emphases
and tactics built into juridical operations do not truly comprehend the
character and phenomena of persuasion correctly or adequately, truth
and justice are more likely traduced than served in the processes of law.
We may find we honor our juridical system of law and justice merely
because we feel we must have it-not because it serves us so well.
IV.

A

GENERAL STATEMENT OF ALTERNATIVE TO THE

ADvERSA RY PRocEss

While seeking to comprehend the characteristics of persuasion as a
mental and emotional process in the individual human being, we may
ask: how do we endeavour to improve the juridical process so that it
better responds to human and juridical capacity and therefore can better
serve human and juridical need? Our analyses may afford some sug-
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gestions. First, the process of juridical decision (outcome determination) can be no better than the capacity and skills of adjudicators.
The capabilities, training and selection of adjudicators define the limits
of judging capability. An adjudicator must understand the operation of
mental and emotional processes in human beings. He must know his
own reasoning tendencies and methods of problem-solving, his emotional dispositions, sensitivities and blocks, and the kind and degree of
bias and value emphasis that characterize him. These are the filtering
agents through which he experiences, analyzes and judges. He needs
sufficient knowledge of mental and emotional processes so that he can
estimate these characteristics and note their operation in others as
well. These are the skills and insights that are critical to the experience
of persuasion and the process of judging.
Clearly, then, those who analyze and judge the conduct of others
(including attorneys and judges) must begin their education with instruction and practice in understanding normal and some abnormal intellective and emotive (psychological) processes. This serves both as an
educative and a screening device, since not all persons are able or likely
to be adept on a personal level to become analysts and judges of behavior. The psychological qualification is no less important than the
mental qualification for effective jurisprudence.
We must also recognize that jurors are neither trained nor qualified
for practice in law. It is our political heritage, not intellectual or
moral necessity, that deems them important to our juridical system.
As we have suggested earlier, their presence and participation does not
assure a cross-sectional representation or more knowledgeable view of
issues. The latter is more likely to be derived from a clear mind, adequately trained in self-knowledge, and able to develop and evaluate
a variety of issues and perspectives representatively. If jurors are a
necessity to the juridical system in our society then minimally they
should meet requirements of mental and emotional competence that
insure their ability to probe for the truth and arrive at fair, representative judgment. One safeguard that may be developed for the juridical
process is the systematic and periodic analysis and review of the competence and qualification of both professional and lay adjudicators.
Review, requalification and reeducation may be essential to the continuance of a vital, knowledgeable and fair judging process.
Given adjudicators with adequate qualifications to analyze and judge,
the juridical system next requires a better means for judging. The adversary method implies that the process of persuasion and decision fol-
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lows patterns of syllogistic reasoning. This is not only incorrect but
misleading. It encourages partisanship of a kind and to a degree that
only obscures and distorts issues. The dimensions of practice deception must then be analyzed before the issues can be faced fairly or
else (and this is likely the case) the juridical system produces a contrived result reflecting the effects of dramatic technique, emotional sensitization, limited reason and arbitrary or naive decision.
An effective process of persuasion is geared to an assembly of various
facts and theories in some orderly arrangement. This enables the
facts and theories to be carefully considered, juxtaposed, examined and
tested, and ultimately fitted so as to produce the most thoughtful result.
This is a sober process and not one that should be harnessed to the
emotional and intellectual pyrotechnics of the traditional trial court
proceeding. The need is for sophisticated and relatively complete
facts and theories that must be closely examined and arranged by
knowledgeable and impartial fact-finders. There are numerous models for this procedure in, for example, the system of court referees,
the presidential fact-finding commission, the legislative investigations
committee, and pre-sentencing investigators. The fact-finders are
properly an arm of the judicial office, providing the substance on which
the adjudicator uses his judging skills. To preserve political traditions
and rights they may be augmented by fact-finders of the parties who
may, if they choose, offer their own constructions of facts and theories.
A preferred principle of admissibility in evidence should be that any
and all evidence be admitted for consideration, subject to the reasonable requirements of time, space and other such practical matters.
The true safeguards of adequate consideration evidence and fair persuasion exist in the tested qualifications of the adjudicators. They do
not exist in the proscription or pre-arrangement of certain choices of
fact and judgment on the theory that fairness or relevance affecting
persuasion are involved. Review of an entire case would be available,
possibly on request or perhaps as a standard procedure. This acts
principally as a check on the reliability of juridical operations.
Let us reflect on some of the implications of the suggested change in
trial procedure. Visibility means, or should mean, that the true issues,
means of decision, and decision are exposed to view. The visibility of
our juridical processes is considered to encourage thought and offer
some assurance that truth and justice prevail. The dramatization is important and serves the purpose of communication about law and justice. But this also involves fair, complete and skillful reporting in com-
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munications media. It is not a matter that requires the offering of high
drama through the medium of a bombastic adversary procedure.
Practical and economic feasibility is another matter concerning the
method and extent to which issues should be heard. In its current condition, the juridical process is expensive, time-consuming, wasteful, uncertain and fails to meet even minimum standards of accountability.
A disciplined and thorough fact-finding procedure geared to clear, consistent and knowledgeable judging procedures offers less complication
and more economy in the use of time, energy and other resources.
The adversary procedure as a practical matter cannot and does not
meet this standard. If this bare statement based on common observation and simple judgment is not convincing, studies of feasibility may
be made to compare current juridical and other decision making procedures on such variables as time requirements, expense, range of issue
consideration, character of judgment and other relevant criteria.
Attorneys, who are a substantial, powerful and important group in
society, may feel threatened by the prospect of technological unemployment if the adversary procedure is discarded. In truth, the adversary procedure and highly competitive trials are no more than a symbol of the lawyer's function and importance in society. He should be
better trained to fill sophisticated fact-finding, issue-determining and
policy-making roles. The thrust of legal education should be more in
concert with attempts to solve the real problems and legal needs in
society, rather than to feed an obsolescent and decrepit system of legal
and judicial decision-making.
We may lastly note and consider the impact of issues, events and circumstances on a revised juridical process that is more consonant with
the facets of human persuasion. The special or esoteric intelligence
and knowledge associated with some issues creates the need for knowledgeable response from adjudicators. This suggests the need for adjudicators with special skills and qualifications in designated matters.
The combination of special issues and general legal consideration may
require a panel of representative adjudicators, adjudicators specially
trained to comprehend and cope with both the exercises of law and justice and the uniqueness of the discipline from which particular issues
emerge.
The limits of persuasion in some events and circumstances also
should be noted. There may be instances where a truly fair consideration of the issues is not possible. A political decision may be required
whether to jeopardize the integrity and reputation of the juridical pro-
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cess by involving it in circumstances where the possibility of fair or substantial decision is in issue. Somewhat related is the idea that, from a
policy and practical point of view, some issues should not be raised to
the level of juridical determination. Some personal, social, family
and business matters are perhaps best remanded to agencies of the
institutions or private communities involved for required resolution.
This suggests the preferred (even the required) alternatives of counseling, arbitration, decision in convention or other appropriate means
rather than litigation as the appropriate form of solution. Criteria
concerning when and when not to litigate, or permit litigation, must be
developed.
A general framework for an improved juridical process and its operation has been suggested. It is more in keeping with, and more accurately reflective of, human capacities and dispositions in persuasion.
It seeks to recognize that persuasion is the essence of the juridical proccess. Persuasion is also a psychological process reflecting mental and
emotional capacities, sensitivities and dispositions. A sketch leaves
much to completion, and this is no more than a sketch. However,
should we regard this exercise as politically naive and practically
unfeasible, we may be spurred on by the oft-repeated observation of a
distinguised and universally respected jurist, Learned Hand: "I must
say that, as a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything
else short of sickness and of death."'
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